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The American Inventors Protection Act: How Should
the Courts Treat the "Substantially Identical"
Requirement of the New Provisional Rights Statute?
I. BACKGROUND
In November of 1999, Congress enacted the American Inventors
Protection Act ("AIPA') as part of the Intellectual Property and
Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999 ("Omnibus Reform
Act").' The AIPA institutes several important changes to the Patent
Act and brings the United States' patent law into greater harmony
with the rest of the industrialized world.2
Subtitle E of the AIPA, entitled "Domestic Publication of Patent
1. Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L No.
106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-521 (1999). Specifically, the AIPA is found in Title IV of the Omnibus
Reform Act. See 113 Stat. 1501A-522, 522-588 (1999).
2. The Patent Act is codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376.
Global harmonization of national patent laws has been the subject of much interest for
well over a decade. In 1985, the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO")
Committee of Experts on the Harmonization of Certain Provisions in Laws for the Protection
of Inventions began meeting to propose a draft treaty for achieving such harmonization. 41
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 231 (Jan. 10, 1991). The Committee of Experts
introduced its first draft in 1990, proposing, among other things, that member countries
automatically publish pending applications within at least twenty-four months of filing and
adopt a first-to-file system. Id. In 1990, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce established an
advisory commission to consider changes to the U.S. patent system. 44 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 502 (Sept. 17, 1992). The final report of the Commission included several
recommendations for change, including instituting a system for publishing pending
applications within twenty-four months of filing. Id. In 1992, bills directed toward
harmonizing certain provisions of the U.S. patent law with the rest of the world were
introduced in both the House and the Senate. 44 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 3
(May 7, 1992). The proposed legislation included, among other things, an eighteen-month
publication requirement. Id. Again in 1994, a bill was introduced providing for
eighteen-month publication and provisional rights. 48 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA)
599 (Oct. 6, 1994). In 1996, Senator Hatch introduced the Omnibus Patent Act of 1996 to the
Senate. 52 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 320 (July 18, 1996). The Omnibus Patent
Act of 1996 included provisions for the publication of patent applications within
eighteen-month of filing, unless the patent was only to be filed in the U.S. Id. In 1997, the
21" Century Patent System Improvement Act was introduced to Congress. 21st Century
Patent System Improvement Act, H.R. 400, available at http://thomas.loc.gov (January 9,
1997). This legislation contained publication and provisional rights provisions that essentially
parallel those found in the AIPA. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
Although the AIPA stops short of instituting a flrst-to-file patent system, the provisions of
Subtitle E of the AIPA bring the United States' patent law into greater harmony with the
patent systems of most other industrialized countries.
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Applications Published Abroad," establishes new laws related to the
publication of domestic applications. 3 In particular, section 4502 of
Subtitle E requires the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("USPTO") to automatically publish domestic patent applications,
which are or will be the subject of a foreign filing in a country that
publishes pending applications within eighteen-months of their
effective filing date, within eighteen-months of their earliest priority
4
date.
Subtitle E represents an almost complete break from the
long-established practice in the United States of maintaining all
applications filed in the USTPO in confidence until the patent
3. 113 Stat. 1501A-561 (1999).
4. Section 4502 is codified in amended 35 U.S.C. § 122. Section 122(b) of Title provides,
in part:
(b) Publication(1) In general: (A) Subject to paragraph (2), each application for a patent shall be
published, in accordance with procedures determined by the Director, promptly after
the expiration of a period of 18 months from the earliest filing date for which a
benefit is sought under this title. At the request of the applicant, an application may
be published earlier than the end of such 18-month period...
(2) Exceptions: (A) An application shall not be published if that application is - (i)
no longer pending; (ii) subject to a secrecy order under section 181 of this title; (iii) a
provisional application filed under section 111(b) of this title; or (iv) an application
for a design patent filed under chapter 16 of this title.
(B)(i) If an applicant makes a request upon filing, certifying that the invention
disclosed in the application has not and will not be the subject of an application filed
in another country, or under a multilateral international agreement, that requires
publication of applications 18 months after filing, the application shall not be
published as provided in paragraph (1). (ii) An applicant may rescind a request made
under clause (i) at any time. (iii) An applicant who has made a request under clause
(i) but who subsequently files, in a foreign country or under a multilateral
international agreement specified in clause (i), an application directed to the invention
disclosed in the application filed in the Patent and Trademark Office, shall notify the
Director of such filing not later than 45 days after the date of the filing of such
foreign or international application. A failure of the applicant to provide such notice
within the prescribed period shall result in the application being regarded as
abandoned, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the Director that the delay in
submitting the notice was unintentional ....
35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
Normally, the priority date of a patent application is the filing date of the application. The
filing date is considered to be the date that the application is received by the USPTO or the
date the application was deposited with the United States Postal Service, if delivered by
"Express Mail." 37 C.ER. §1.6 ("Receipt of Correspondence"). However, under the Patent Act
(Title 35), an applicant can claim the benefit of the filing date of an earlier fied application
under certain circumstances. See e.g. 35 U.S.C. §§ 119-122, 356 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
Most countries publish pending applications within 18 months of their earliest priority
date. See John F Duffy et al., Early Patent Publication:A Boon or Bane? A Discussion on
the Legal and Economic Effects of Publishing Applications After Eighteen Months of Filing,
16 CARDOZO ATS & ENT. LJ.601, 602-03 (1998).
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issues. 5 Under the pre-existing system, patent applicants could file
and prosecute their patent application before the USPTO in
secrecy. 6 If the patent claims were not allowed, the applicant could
retain his invention as a trade secret if he so desired. However, this
practice is no longer be possible under the AIPA (at least if the
patent is to be foreign filed), as the patent application 7 will be
available to the public at least eighteen-months from filing.
The publication of patent applications prior to issuance of the
patent permits competitors not only to see and design around the
disclosed technology, but also gives competitors the ability to make
and use the disclosed technology before a patent issues without
legal recourse by the applicant. The rights of a patent holder, i.e.,
the rights to prevent others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling a patented invention, do not arise until a patent is issued. 8
Thus, potential infringers can appropriate technologies disclosed in
published applications for their own benefit and without recourse,
provided that the infringing activity ceases before the patent
issues. 9 In order to at least partially close this loophole, Congress
5. Applicants may opt out of early publication by filing an affidavit certifying that the
invention will not be the subject of a foreign filing. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B) (1994 & Supp. V
2000). See also 37 C.FR. § 1.213 ("Non Publication Requests").
6. All U.S. patent applications are subjected to examination by the USPTO prior to
issuance. During examination, a USPTO patent examiner will review the claims and
specification of the pending application and either allow or reject the claims based on the
requirements of the Patent Act and the existing prior art. If the examiner rejects one or
more claims in the application, the applicant is given a chance to respond to the rejection by
making appropriate amendments and/or arguing against the rejection. If the examiner
accepts the amendments/arguments, the claims will be allowed and the patent can be issued
upon payment of the required fees. This "negotiation" process between the examiner and the
applicant in moving the application from filing to issuance is termed "prosecution" of the
patent application. The record of correspondence between the USPTO and the applicant (i.e.,
the prosecution history), including all amendments and arguments made by the applicant in
obtaining allowance of the claims of an application, are contained in the application's "file
wrapper." Under the pre-existing system, the file wrapper was maintained in confidence if a
patent did not issue. Under Subtitle E of the AIPA, copies of the file wrapper contents can
be available for public inspection at the time the application is published. See 37 C.ER. 1.14
(c)(2) ("File Wrapper and Contents").
7. If the applicant claims priority from an earlier foreign filed or provisional
application, the application could be published in as little as fourteen weeks from the actual
filing of the non-provisional, domestic application. Helpful Hints Regarding Publication of
Patent Applications, 1249 USPTO O.G. 83 (August 21, 2001), available at http://
(August 21, 2001). If the
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2001/week34/pathint.htm
applicant does not claim priority, and does not opt out of publication, the application will
publish eighteen months after filing. Id. An applicant can also request an earlier publication.
35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 2000). See also 37 C.YR. § 1.219 ("Early Publication
Requests").
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
9. See Philippe Signore, The New ProvisionalRights Provision, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
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enacted section 4504 of the Subtitle E, creating "provisional rights"
that allow an applicant to collect "reasonable royalties" for the
unauthorized making, using, offering for sale, or selling of a
published invention during the time period between publication of
the patent application and issuance of a patent on that
application.10
Although provisional rights compensate an applicant for actions
occurring between publication and issuance, provisional rights do
not accrue until the patent is issued, and then only to the extent
that the "invention as claimed in the patent is substantially
identical to the invention as claimed in the published patent
application."" However, the AIPA lacks any express guidance as to
OFF. Soc'y 742, 742-43 (October 2000) (discussing an illustrative case, National Presto Indus.,

Inc. v. The West Bend Co., 76 F3d 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
10. Section 4504 of the AIPA is codified in amended 35 U.S.C. § 154. Section 154(d) of
Title 35 provides, in part:
(d) Provisional Rights (1) In General. - In addition to other rights provided by this section, a patent shall
include the right to obtain reasonable royalty from any person who, during the period
beginning on the date of publication of the application for such patent under section
122(b), or in the case of an international application filed under the treaty defined in
section 351(a) designating the United States under Article 21(2)(a) of such treaty, the
date of publication of the application, and ending on the date the patent is issued (A)(i) makes, uses, offers for sale, or sells in the United States the invention as
claimed in the published patent application or imports such an invention into the
United States; or (ii) if the invention as claimed in the published patent application is
a process, uses, offers for sale, or sells in the United States or imports into the United
States products made by that process as claimed in the published patent application;
and (B) had actual notice of the published patent application and, in a case in which
the right arising under this paragraph is based upon an international application
designating the United States that is published in a language other than English, had a
translation of the international application into the English language.
(2) Right Based on Substantially Identical Inventions. - The right under paragraph
(1) to obtain reasonable royalties shall not be available under this subsection unless
the invention as claimed in the patent is substantially identical to the invention as
claimed in the published patent application ....
35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 2000) (emphasis added). For statutory
language, see supra note 10. Under 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1)(B), the applicant must also provide
the would-be infringer with actual notice of the published patent application to collect
reasonable royalties. Although the statute itself does not define "actual notice," the legislative
history suggests that actual notice requires, at least, that the applicant serve the would-be
infringer with a copy of the published application and identify the activity that the applicant
believes gives rise to provisional rights. As discussed in the Section-by-Section Analysis of
House Bill H.R.1907:
The requirement of actual notice is critical. The mere fact that the published
application is included in a commercial database where it might be found is
insufficient. The published applicant must give actual notice of the published
application to the accused infringer and explain what acts are regarded as giving rise
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how the courts should interpret and apply the "substantially
identical" requirement. Although the legislative history of the AIPA
and earlier related legislation gives some insight into what
Congress contemplated by this requirement, the courts have not yet
interpreted or applied this standard.12 This comment will consider
how the courts should construe and apply the substantially
identical requirement of the provisional rights statute in view of the
policy considerations surrounding both the early publication of
patent applications and the granting of provisional rights.
I.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SHAPING THE EARLY PUBLICATION OF
PATENT APPLICATIONS

The Domestic Publication of Patent Applications Published
Abroad Act (Subtitle E) targets for publication applications that
have been or will be published as foreign filings, in part, to level
the playing field with competitors in those foreign countries.1 3
Because patent applications filed in most foreign countries will be
published in the native language prior to issuance, foreign inventors
and competitors are given a head-start on design-around and
improvement activities, thereby creating a so called "pipeline" of
U.S. technology to foreign countries. 4 U.S. inventors, however, do
to provisional rights.
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1907, H.R. REP. No. 106-287,
Section-by-Section Analysis, at 39-69 (1999) available at http://thomas.loc.gov (Aug. 3, 1999).
How the courts will treat this requirement, like the substantially identical requirement, is
the subject of speculation.
12. Cf. 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.02[4][e] Supp., n.59 (2001)
(commenting that "[t]he 'substantially identical' standard will undoubtedly create difficult
issues").
13. See Paul A. Ragusa, Eighteen Months to Publication:Should the United States Join
Europe and Japan By Promptly PublishingPatent Applications? 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L &
ECON. 143, 165-68 (1992).
14. Id. at 151. "In the United States, there is a concern that early disclosure of U.S.
technology enables Japanese companies to make minor improvements on published and
unprotected technology and to file their own patent applications. This situation has been
described as a 'pipeline' that feeds Japan with U.S. technology." Id. (internal citations
omitted).
The problem is described in the Background and Need section of the House Report on the
AIPA as follows:
While our foreign competitors are able to see the latest U.S. patent technology in their
native language barely six months after a U.S. inventor files a patent application in
their country, the reverse is not true. U.S. researchers and investors are denied the
opportunity to learn what their foreign competitors are working on until a U.S. patent
issues. This causes duplicative research and wasted developmental expenditures,
putting U.S. inventors at a serious disadvantage vis-a-vis their foreign counterparts
and competitors.
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not have the same opportunity to "preview" technologies contained
in U.S. applications because the U.S. traditionally has not published
patent applications.' 5 The early publication provisions of the AIPA
rectify this imbalance by giving U.S. inventors similar access to the
information contained in U.S. patent applications.
If an applicant does not file his application in a foreign country
that publishes applications, however, there is no threat that foreign
competitors will have earlier access to the technology than their
U.S. counterparts. Accordingly, the AIPA carves out an exception to
the automatic publication requirement for applicants that intend to
file only in the U.S.' 6 This domestic-only exception also serves to
assuage the concerns of "small entity" inventors who fear that early
publication of applications might permit large corporate
competitors to capitalize on their inventions before the patent
issues, thereby diminishing or destroying the value of their
technology. 17 Typically, small entity inventors only file in the U.S.
because they often do not have the funds to file foreign patent
applications. By permitting inventors who file only in the U.S. (or
other non-publishing countries) to opt out of the early publication
process, small entity inventors will have the opportunity to decide
whether participation in the early publication process is beneficial
to their business.
Other policy concerns addressed by early publication include, for
example, surfacing "submarine patents." Submarine patents are
patents issued on applications filed in the USPTO well before the
enabling technologies are developed to take advantage of the
invention, or before the market for that invention has been
developed. The application is kept pending in secrecy in the
USPTO for many years, even decades, by exploiting the prosecution
process, until the technology ripens. Once the technology ripens,
the patentee allows the "submarine" to "surface" (i.e., issue as a
patent) and uses the patent to hold the market captive.' 8
H.R REP. No. 106-287, Background and Need for the Legislation, at 31-33.
15. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
16. 16. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i). See supra note 4 for statutory language.
17. See Len S. Smith, Note, Promoting the Progress of Science and America's Small
Entity Inventors: Inventing an Improved U.S. Patent Application Publication Provision
Out of the PriorArt, 77 WASH. U. LQ. 585, 600 (Summer 1999). One particular concern is that
large corporate competitors will be able to produce non-infringing "secondary products"
based on the disclosure, and that such products will seriously erode the value of the patent.
Id. Furthermore, small entity inventors are concerned that publication of a pending
application will erode the value of the potential protection, thereby limiting ability of small
entities to attract venture capital money based on their intellectual property. Id.
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POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SHAPING THE PROVISIONAL RIGHT STATUTE

The provisional rights afforded under the AIPA provide
applicants with a mechanism to seek compensation for the
unauthorized copying of their published invention.1 9 As previously
discussed, without provisional rights an applicant would have no
recourse under the Patent Act for activities occurring prior to
issuance, or even after the patent issued, because no enforceable
patent existed at the time the infringing activity occurred. In other
words, as of the date of publication, an applicant cannot prevent
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
disclosed in the published application. Such rights arise only after
the patent is issued. Thus, provisional rights do not protect the
patentee's rights as a patent holder, because no such rights exist
prior to issuance. Instead, the provisional rights legislation
encourages participation in the early publication process and deters
would-be infringers.2 0
The substantial identity requirement of the provisional rights
legislation tempers the motivational function of granting provisional
rights by ensuring that the claims of the published application
provide reasonable notice to the public as to what the applicant
believes to be the bounds of his invention. The requirement
circumscribes the ability of the inventor to recover, as explained:
[an] important limitation on the availability of provisional
royalties is that the claims in the published application that
18. Id. at 596. Other rationales for pre-grant publication include reducing "uncertainty
among investors and industry as a whole with respect to the extent of the art that already
exists" and "stimulating innovation and improvements upon prior technology." Ragusa, supra
note 13, at 174.
19. The compensation provided for in section 154(d) is reasonable royalties. See supra
note 10 (statutory language). Reasonable royalties are the least amount a successful plaintiff
can collect for infringement of a valid patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
Congress rejected a broader range of remedies for provisional rights, such as injunctive relief
and lost profits. Signore, supra note 9, at 757. Further, section 284 of the Patent Act, which
provides that a court may award treble damages at its discretion, does not apply to awards
under the provisional rights section. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
20. See Signore, supra note 9, at 755-59. However, Signore argues that the deterrent
effect of the provisional rights statute is minimal because reasonable royalties are simply not
sufficient to deter copying. "The idea of paying reasonable royalties to a small inventor only
after the copier has lost a million dollar law suit does not strike terror into the heart of a
large entity with a full time staff of attorneys and would not likely discourage any large
entity from infringing." Id. at 755 (quoting The Omnibus Patent Act of 1997: Hearings on
S.507 Before the Subcomm. on Government Programs and Oversight of the Committee on
Small Business, 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of Mr. Kramer, Vice President of the Alliance
for American Innovation)).
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are alleged to give rise to provisional rights must also appear
in the patent in substantially identical form. To allow anything
less than substantial identity would impose an
unacceptable burden on the public. If provisional rights were
available in the situation where the only valid claim infringed
first appeared in substantially that form in the granted patent,
the public would have no guidance as to the specific behavior
to avoid between publication and grant. Every person or
company that might be operating within the scope of the
disclosure of the published application would have to conduct
her own private examination to determine whether a published
application contained patentable subject matter that she
should avoid. The burden should be on the applicant to
initially draft a schedule of claims that gives adequate notice
to the public of what she is seeking to patent.21
Thus, Congress apparently desired the substantial identity
requirement to compel an applicant to provide adequate notice to
the public of that which he believes to be his invention. As a
consequence, the burden on the public with respect to determining
what actions should be avoided is lessened.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROVISIONAL RIGHTS'
CLAIM-IDENTITY REQUIREMENT

As discussed above, provisional rights are available to a patentee
if, inter alia, "the invention as claimed in the patent is substantially
identical to the invention as claimed in the published patent
application."22 While Congress did not expressly define the term
"substantially identical" in the AIPA, guidance regarding Congress'
understanding of this "claim-identity" requirement can be found in
House Committee Report 105-39 addressing the 21s Century Patent
System Improvement Act, which is the forerunning legislation to
the AIPA.? According to this House Report, "the requirement for
21.
22.

H.R. REP. No. 106-287, Section-by-Section Analysis, at 39-69.
35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 2000). See supra note 11 and accompanying

text
23. 21" Century Patent System Improvement Act, or H.R. 400, was introduced in the
105th Congress. 11R. REP. No. 105-39 (1997) available at http://thomas.loc.gov (March 20,
1997). According to the Background and Need section of the House Bill introducing the AIPA
to the 106th Congress, H.R. 1907, the lineage of the AIPA can be traced back to H.R. 400 and
its companion legislation S.507. H.R. REP. No. 106-287, Background and Need for the
Legislation, at 31-33. See supra note 2.
Title U1 of H.R. 400 (entitled "Examining Procedure Improvements: Publication with
Provisional Royalties; Term Extensions; Further Examination") contained many of the

2002

American Inventors Protection Act

'substantial identity' in this section is based, by analogy, upon the
decisional law for establishing intervening rights under the reissue
statute."24
The reissue statute is found in sections 251 and 252 of the Patent
Act. 25 Under the reissue statute, a patentee may obtain a reissued

patent for the purpose of correcting some error or defect in a
previously issued patent. 26 To obtain a reissue patent, the patentee
must surrender his original patent and submit a reissue application
for de novo examination by the USPTO.27 A request for reissue can
be made, for example, to correct errors in the original patent,
including errors in overclaiming or underclaiming.28 Thus, claim
amendments during reissue can either narrow (i.e., correct an
overclaiming error) or broaden (i.e., correct an underclain-ing
error) the scope of the patent claims.2 9
According to the first paragraph of section 252, insofar as the
claims of the reissued patent are "substantially identical" to the
claims of the original patent, the surrender of the original patent
will not extinguish any cause of action then existing against
provisions found in Subtitle E of the AIPA. Significantly, the provisions introduced into the
Patent Act by the AIPA concerning the creation of provisional rights and the substantially
identical requirement (now found in 35 U.S.C. §154(d)) are almost verbatim reproductions of
portions of section 204 (entitled "Provisional Rights") of Title I. 143 CONG. REC. H1629-01,
H1650 (April 17, 1997). See also, Signore, supra note 9, at n.32 (noting that "[tihe provisional
rights provision proposed in S.507 [is] identical in substance to new 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) ...
[clonsequently, the legislative history of S.507 . . . is relevant to interpreting 35 U.S.C.
§154(d)"). Accordingly, this comment will refer to the Committee Report for H.R. 400 for aid
in understanding the substantially identical requirement.
24. H.R REP. No. 105-39 (1997).
25. 35 U.S.C. §§ 251-52 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
26. The reissue statute provides, in pertinent part:
[wihenever any patent is, through error without any deceptive intention, deemed
wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective specification or
drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to
claim in the patent, the Director shall, on the surrender of such patent and the
payment of the fee required by law, reissue the patent for the invention disclosed in
the original patent, and in accordance with a new and amended application, for the
unexpired part of the term of the original patent.
35 U.S.C. § 251.
27. Id.
28. See J. Christopher Carraway, The Uncertain Future of Enforcing Patents that Have
Been Broadened Through Reissue, 8 FED. Ci. B.J. 63, 65 (Summer 1998) (discussing
overclaiming and underclaiming errors). See also supra note 26 (statutory language).
29. Broadening amendments can only be made within two years from the grant of the
original patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (stating that "[n]o reissued patent shall be granted
enlarging the scope of the claims of the original patent unless applied for within two years
from the grant of the original patent").
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infringers.30 Moreover, to the extent that the reissued patent's
claims are substantially identical to those of the original patent,
"the reissued patent... shall constitute a continuation thereof3 and
have effect continuously from the date of the original patent." '
While the legislative history surrounding the AIPA suggests that
the claim-identity requirement of the new provisional rights
legislation should be construed by the courts in a manner
analogous to the courts' construction of the reissue statute's
claim-identity requirement; no cases have been decided yet
interpreting the new legislation. However, as discussed below,
because the provisional rights statute implicates different policy
considerations than the reissue statute, other factors must
influence the courts' application of the substantially identical
requirement in the case of provisional rights.
V.

BREAKING DOWN THE REISSUE ANALOGY: POLICY, CONSTRUCTION &
APPLICATION OF THE CLAIM-IDENTITY REQUIREMENT IN REISSUE

A.

Policy ConsiderationsShaping the Reissue Claim-Identity
Requirement

Section 252 of the Patent Act provides that a reissue patent be
given the same effect and operation as if the patent had been
originally granted in that form, provided that the claims in the
reissue patent are "identical" to the original claims. 32 In Seattle Box
30. 35 U.S.C. §252 1 (1994 & Supp. V 2000). The complete statutory language reads as
follows:
[tihe surrender of the original patent shall take effect upon the issue of the reissued
patent, and every reissued patent shall have the same effect and operation in law, on
the trial of actions for causes thereafter arising, as if the same had been originally
granted in such amended form, but in so far as the claims of the original and reissued
patent are substantially identical, such surrender shall not affect any action then
pending nor abate any cause of action then existing, and the reissue patent, to the
extent that its claims are substantially identical with the original patent, shall
constitute a continuation thereof and have effect continuously from the date of the
original patent.
Id.
31. Id. Prior to the enactment of the Omnibus Reform Act, section 252 referred only to
claims that were "identical" with those in the original patent. In the Omnibus Reform Act,
Congress added the modifier "substantially" to the term "identical" to codify years of case
law interpreting the term "identical" in then existing section 252. See H.R. REP. No. 105-39
(explaining that "[iun section 252 of title 35, the term 'identical' has, heretofore, been used
without qualification, but the courts have interpreted that term to encompass claims that are
'substantially identical.' That standard ... has now been explicitly codified in section 252 ...
by a conforning amendment.") (citing Slimfold Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 810 F2d
1112 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). See also Signore, supra note 9, at 752-53.
32. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. For clarity, the terms "identical" and
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Company v. Industrial Crating & Packing, the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals discussed Congress' motivation for enacting the
first paragraph of section 252.3 According to the court, prior to
Congress' enactment of section 252, holders of reissued patents
could not sustain an infringement action for any act done prior to
the reissue.Y This result stemmed from the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the then-existing statutory language, which
required reissued patents to be considered new patents,
enforceable only with respect to causes of action accruing after
reissue.35 Because a patentee had to surrender his original patent to
obtain the reissue patent, once the reissue patent issued, the
original patent no longer existed and the courts "acted... as if the
36
original patent never was."
However, this interpretation had the discordant effect of
preventing a patentee from enforcing his patent rights prior to
reissue, even where the changes made on reissue had no
meaningful effect on the scope of coverage of the claims. As a
consequence, Congress enacted the first paragraph of section 252
"to ameliorate the harsh effect of a patent's surrender . . .-.
Under this section, Congress permitted "the claims of . . . [a]
reissue patent to reach back to the date the original patent issued"
under certain circumstances, that is, when the claims in the reissue
patent were "identical" to the claims in the original patent.-8
The reissue statute's claim-identity requirement strikes a balance
between a patentee's rights to enforce his patent and the public's
right to rely on the claims set forth in the original patent.39 Because
the claims of a patent define the boundaries of protection granted
by the patent, the claims provide notice to the public of what the
"substantially identical" will be used interchangeably. See supra note 31 (discussing the
interchangeability of these terms).
33. 731 F2d 818 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See supra note 30 for complete statutory language.
34. Seattle Box, 731 F2d at 827 (referencing Federico, Intervening Rights in Patent
Reissues, 30 GEO.WASH. L REV. 603, 605 (1962)). See also 4 DONALD S. CIMSUM, CMsuM ON
PATENTS § 15.02[7) (2001).
35. "[1]f a re-issue is granted, the patentee has no rights except such as grow out of the
re-issued patent. He has none under the original. That is extinguished ....
[N]o damages
can be recovered for any acts of infringement committed prior to the re-issue." Peck v.
Collins, 103 U.S. (13 Otto.) 660, 664 (1881) quoted in 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS

§ 15.02[7] (2001).
36. Seattle Box, 731 F2d at 827.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Reliance on the patent system is a recurring theme in patent policy. See Carraway,
supra note 28, at 70-75.
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patentee regards as his own.40 To avoid infringing on the claims a
granted patent, a competitor can design around, i.e., outside the
scope of, the claims of an issued patent. Nevertheless, because a
patentee can change the scope of his original claims through
reissue, the previously non-infringing activities may be found to
infringe the claims contained in the reissue patent.4 A competitor
will rely on the claims of the original patent in conducting his
work; therefore inequity would result in permitting the patentee to
retroactively enforce the "new" claims of the reissue patent against
the competitor for activities taking place prior to reissue. 42
However, the same inequity does not exist when the reissued
claims are identical to the original claims. Accordingly, section 252
permits the claims of a reissue patent to relate back to the date
that the original patent was issued, so long as the reissue claims
are "identical" to the original claims. 43
40. The Patent Act requires that an applicant for a patent "particularly point out and
distinctly . . . [claim] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35
U.S.C. §112 2 (1994 & Supp. V).
41. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text (discussing claim amendments in
reissue).
2. Intervening
42. Also, section 252 provides for intervening rights. 35 U.S.C. § 252
rights arise when a competitor's previously non-infringing activity becomes an infringing one
based upon a reissue patent with broadened claims. Id. A court, in equity, may permit the
competitor to continue the infringing activity, even after the issuance of the reissue patent,
based upon the competitor's earlier non-infringing conduct. See e.g. Seattle Box Co., Inc. v.
Indus. Crating and Packaging, Inc. ("Seattle Box II', 756 E2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(considering result on remand of Seattle Box and discussing intervening rights).
43. Similar considerations arise in the context of reexamination. In reexamination, an
issued patent is subject to a new examination by the USPTO based upon a showing of a
substantially new question of patentability. See 37 C.YR. § 1.510 ("Request for
Reexamination"). During the reexamination proceedings, new claims may be added and the
original claims in the patent may be modified. 37 C.FR. § 1.530(d) ("Making Amendments in
a Reexamination Proceeding"). After reexamination, the USPTO will issue a certificate that
cancels claims found to be unpatentable and confirms claims found to be patentable. 35
U.S.C. § 307 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
As set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 307(b):
[any proposed amended or new claim determined to be patentable and incorporated
into a patent following a reexamination proceeding will have the same effect as that
specified in § 252 . . . for reissued patents on the right of any person who made,
purchased, or used within the United States... anything patented by such proposed
amended or new claim . . . prior to issuance of a certificate . . . [of reexamination].

35 U.S.C. § 307(b).
In Kaufman Co., Inc. v. Lantech, Inc., the Federal Circuit adopted the Seattle Box
"without substantive change" standard for determining whether claims, which were amended
in a reexamination proceedings, would be given effect prior to the issuance of the certificate
of reexamination. Kaufmian Co., Inc. v. Lantech, Inc., 807 F.2d 970, 975-77. (Fed. Cir. 1986). In
Kaufman, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding that the amendments made
during reexamination did not change the scope of the claims, but merely clarified the original
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Thus, the clear purpose of the reissue claim-identity requirement
is two-fold: (1) to protect both the patentee's rights as a patent
holder; and (2) to safeguard the public's reliance on the patent
system."
B.

Judicial Construction & Application of the Reissue
Claim-Identity Requirement

In Seattle Box, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
directly addressed the construction and application of the
claim-identity requirement of the reissue statute. 45 Although the
Federal Circuit stopped short of deciding exactly what the term
"identical" meant, the court announced, "[i]t is clear . . . that
'identical' means, at most, 'without substantive change.' "46
The Federal Circuit further elaborated on the construction of this
claim-identity requirement in subsequent cases. In Slimfold
Manufacturing v. Kinkead Industries, the court stated that it is
47
the scope of the claims that must be identical, not the words used.
Thus, no per se rule exists to prevent a reissue claim from having
continuous effect from the date of the original patent as a result of
amending the claim language. 48 In Bloom Engineering v. North
American Manufacturing, the same court observed: "There is no
absolute rule for determining whether an amended claim is legally
identical to an original claim. An amendment that clarifies the text
of . . . [a] claim or makes it more definite without affecting its
49
scope is generally viewed as identical for the purpose of § 252."
Further, in Laitram v. NEC, the Federal Circuit posed the
pertinent inquiry into whether claims were legally identical (i.e.,
"without substantive change") as follows: "[t]o determine whether a
claim. Kaufman, 807 F.2d at 977. Accordingly, the reexamined claims were given continuous
effect from the date of the original patent. Id.
44. The Federal Circuit has observed that the reissue provisions of the Patent Act are
"based on fundamental principles of equity and fairness and should be so applied to the facts
in any given case that justice will be done both to the patentee and to the public." Slimfold,
810 F2d at 1116 (quoting In re Wllingham, 282 F2d 353, 354-55 (CCPA 1960)).
45. Seattle Box, 731 F2d at 827.
46. Id. at 827-28 (emphasis in original).
47. Slimfold, 810 E2d at 1115. See also Bloom Engineering Co., Inc. v. North American
Mfg. Co., Inc., 129 E3d 1247, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that "'[ildentical' does not mean
verbatim ....
").
48. Slimfold, 810 F.2d at 1116.
49. Bloom Engineering, 129 F3d at 1250. Although Bloom Engineering arose in the
context of reexamination, as opposed to reissue, the same claim-identity standard applies,
and courts have cited reissue precedent in reexamination cases and vice versa. See supra
note 43 (discussing reexamination vis-a-vis reissue).
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claim change is substantive it is necessary to analyze the claims of
the original and the reexamined patents in light of the particular
facts, including the prior art, the prosecution history, other claims,
and any other pertinent information. "50
The Federal Circuit's application of the reissue claim-identity
requirement in Seattle Box illustrates how the "without substantive
change" construction supports reissue policy. In Seattle Box, both
parties were engaged in the business of providing oil pipe bundling
services. 51 Seattle Box, the plaintiff, developed a bundling system to
enable oil companies to safely ship pipe of varying lengths and
diameters. 52 In particular, the plaintiff's bundling system consisted
of tiers of parallel wood beams, called "sleepers," supporting
lengths of pipes that were separated by spacer blocks having a
double-concave configuration, The spacer blocks were positioned
between adjacent lengths of pipe to provide both horizontal
separation between the pipes and vertical separation between
M As initially claimed in Seattle Box's patent
adjacent sleepers.5
application, the spacer blocks were to have a "height substantially
equal to the thickness of the tier of pipe lengths."55 However,
during prosecution, the patent attorney for Seattle Box inexplicably
amended the claim to require the spacers to have a height "greater
than the diameter of the pipe."5 6 Thus, as originally issued, the
claims to Seattle Box's bundling system required the spacer blocks
to have a height greater than the diameter of the pipe.
Approximately two years after the original patent issued, Seattle
Box successfully obtained a reissue patent, wherein the claims
involving the spacer blocks were broadened to encompass spacers
having a "height substantially equal to or greater than the thickness
of the tier of pipe length." 57 However, during the two years between
the grant of the original patent and the reissued patent, the
defendant began producing a similar bundling system. To avoid
infringing on the claims of the original Seattle Box patent, the
50. Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp. ("Laitram IV, 163 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(quoting Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp. ("Laitram 1'), 952 F2d 1357, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
The Laitram cases arose in the context of reexamination. See supra notes 43 (discussing
reexamination vis-a-vis reissue).
51. Seattle Box, 731 F.2d at 819.
52. Id. at 820.
53. Id. at 821.
54. Id. at 820-21 & figs. 1-4.
55. Id. at 821.
56. Seattle Box, 731 E2d at 821.
57. Id. at 822.
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defendant's spacer blocks were made approximately one-sixteenth
of an inch less than the diameter of the pipes.ms
Prior to reissue, Seattle Box sued the defendant for infringement
of the original patent. 59 After receiving its reissued patent, Seattle
Box amended its complaint to allege infringement under the
reissued patent as well. 60 Judgment was entered against the
defendant for infringement from the date of the original patent.6 '
However, on appeal the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's award of damages for infringement prior to the
62
granting of reissue.
After announcing that the term "identical" in the reissue statute
"means, at most, 'without substantive change,'" the Federal Circuit
specifically found that "Seattle Box, in broadening its claims' scope
to cover not only spacer blocks 'greater than' but also 'substantially
equal to' the diameter of the pipes in a bundle . . . made [a]
substantive change to its claims."63 Accordingly, because Seattle
Box made a substantive change to its claims during reissue, the
reissued claims were not entitled to reach back to the date of the
original patent.64
The result in Seattle Box is consistent with the policy
considerations that influenced the inclusion of the claim-identity
requirement in the reissue statute. 65 Because the defendant relied
on the claims as they appeared in the originally issued patent to
develop what was believed to be a non-infringing alternative to
Seattle Box's bundling system, to allow Seattle Box to subsequently
58. Id. at 828. On advice of the defendant's patent counsel, the blocks were to have a
height at least one-sixteenth of an inch less than the diameter of the pipes. Id.
59. Id. at 820.
60. Id.
61. Seattle Box, 731 F.2d at 820.
62. Id. at 828.
63. Id. at 827-28.
64. In other words, when Seattle Box surrendered its original patent to obtain the
reissue, the claims of the original patent ceased to exist. After reissue, only the claims of the
reissue patent could be enforced against infringement, and only from the time of the reissue,
unless the reissue claims were "identical" (i.e., without substantive change) to claims in the
original patent. As discussed above, under section 252, if the claims are identical, the reissue
claims are permitted by legislative grace to reach back to the date of the original patent, and
therefore, the reissue claims can be enforced from the date of the original patent. However,
because the court determined that Seattle Box made substantive changes to its claims during
reissue, the identity requirement of section 252 could not be met; thus, Seattle Box could
only sue for infringing activities that occurred after reissue. Additionally, Seattle Box
addressed the question of intervening rights for infringing activities occurring after the
reissue. See Id. at 828-30.
65. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
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broaden its claims through reissue to cover the defendant's
previously non-infringing activity and collect damages for the time
period prior to reissue would be inequitable. More generally, the
public must be permitted to rely on the patent system and issued
patents to understand how far the patentee's rights extend. Here,
the notice function that an issued patent performs is a significant
policy concern. Accordingly, in applying the claim-identity
requirement to reissued patents, the courts have denied continuous
effect to reissued claims where the scope of the claim was changed
66
during reissue.
While this construction and application of the claim-identity
requirement in reissue cases serves to protect reliance on the
patent system while vindicating the patentee's rights, as discussed
below, such a construction has the potential to unduly constrain
the functioning of the provisional rights statute.
VI.

DEFICIENCIES IN EXTENDING REISSUE PRECEDENT TO THE
PROVISIONAL RIGHTS STATUTE: SEATTLE Box REVISITED

As is evident from the foregoing policy discussion, the inclusion
of the substantial identity requirement, in both the reissue and
provisional rights statutes, strikes a balance between the interests
of the public and the interests of the patentee. However, the nature
of the interest at stake in each instance differs.
In a reissue, the public has a compelling interest in the ability to
rely upon the claims of an issued patent in order to direct their
work.6 7 The weight of this interest justifies the courts' relatively
strict approach to substantial identity in that the claims of a reissue
patent are denied reach-back effect if not identical in scope to
those originally issued. Interestingly, in the case of provisional
rights, the public's interest in relying on the published claims is less
compelling. Specifically, because the claims of the published
application have not yet undergone a thorough examination by the
USPTO, the public's reliance on the scope of the claims of a
published applicant is unwarranted. Moreover, the public should be
aware that the claims of published applications are likely to change
during prosecution. Accordingly, a strict approach to substantial
66. See generally 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 15.05[4] & Supp. (2001)
(discussing intervening rights and narrowing reissues).
67. "The claims, specification, and file history... constitute the public record of the
patentee's claims, a record on which the public is entitled to rely." Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F3d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) quoted in Carraway, supra note 28,
at 71.
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identity is less justified.68
Additionally, because amendments affecting the scope of an
application's claims are routinely made during prosecution, a strict
approach to the claim-identity requirement would effectively deny
provisional rights to a vast number of applicants, regardless of the
reasons for which the amendments were made. Under such
circumstances, the offer of provisional rights would hold little sway
to either motivate participation in the publication/patenting process
or deter copying of the published invention. 69 As a consequence,
the provisional rights statute would become a virtual nullity.
In sum, if provisional rights are denied when any amendment
affecting the scope of a claim is made, the interests of the patentee
will not be adequately protected, while those of the public will be
overprotected. The incongruity of extending case law construing
the claim-identity requirement of the reissue statute to cases
involving provisional rights can be illustrated by reconsidering the
result in Seattle Box, this time in the context of the provisional
rights statute.
As discussed above, Seattle Box addressed when the claims of a
reissue patent should be permitted to be operative as of the grant
date of the original patent.70 Specifically, in Seattle Box, the court
denied continuous effect to the reissue claims because the patentee
made a substantive change to the scope of the claims by
broadening them during reissue. Because a substantive change was
made, the reissue claims were deemed not to be identical to the
original claims, and therefore did not meet the statutory
71
requirement for reach back.
68. At least one commentator has observed that because section 252 permits a
patentee to broaden the claims of his patent for up to two years after issuance, even in the
case of reissue the public cannot "truly rely on the claims of a patent until two years have
elapsed from the original issuance ... . " Carraway, supra note 28, at 72-73. Moreover, "[tihe
purpose of the law that a broadening reissue must be applied for within two years after a
patent grant is to set a limited time after which the public may rely on the scope of the
claims of an issued patent." Id. at 73 (quoting In re Fotland, 779 F2d 31, 33 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
Thus, Carraway notes that "competitors are actually discouraged from relying on the claim
language and designing around those claims until two years have passed without a reissue."
Id. at 73. How much more should competitors not rely on the claims of an unexamined
patent application!
69. See supra note 20 (discussing at least one commentator's view that the award of
reasonable royalties, regardless of how the statute is construed, provides little motivation or
deterrence).
70. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (discussing policy considerations
surrounding awarding provisional rights).
71. As previously discussed, this result is generally consistent with the policy
considerations surrounding the reissue statute. The public should be permitted to rely on the
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Had Seattle Box arisen in the context of provisional rights,
instead of reissue, and the court adopted reissue precedent for
construing the claim-identity requirement of the provisional rights
statute, the patentee (Seattle Box) similarly would have been
denied relief.72 When this result is considered in isolation, the
application of the reissue precedent seems to produce the correct
result. However, a more thorough consideration of the effect of
applying reissue precedent to provisional rights cases, particularly
in light of the pertinent policy considerations, demonstrates the
deficiency of this approach. Consider the following hypothetical
73
situations adapted from Seattle Box.
A.

Broadening Amendments During Prosecution
1. Hypothetical One ("HI')

Seattle Box files a patent application containing claims that
recite a bundling system comprising spacer blocks with a height
that is greater than the diameter of the pipe to be bundled. Under
the new publication provisions of the AIPA, the application is
subsequently published eighteen-months from its earliest priority
date.74 During prosecution, however, Seattle Box amends the claims
to recite a spacer with a height substantially equal to or greater
than the diameter of the pipe to be bundled. The amendments
clearly broaden the scope of the claims that were initially
published in the application. A patent subsequently issues on the
published application with the broadened claims.
Assume now that after publication of the application and prior
to issuance of the Seattle Box patent, the defendant begins making
and selling a bundling system similar to that disclosed in the
published application, but with one modification. Instead of using
spacers having a height greater than the diameter of the pipe, the
defendant's bundling system uses spacer blocks having a height
one-sixteenth of an inch less than the diameter of the pipe.

claims of an issued patent to direct his activities. It would be inequitable to permit a
patentee to broaden the claims of an original patent during reissue to encompass previously
non-infringing activities by extending the reach of the broadened reissue claims back to the
date the original patent was issued. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
72. More specifically, because in Seattle Box the claims were broadened, they would
not be "without substantive change" and, thus, not substantially identical.
73. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying test for further discussion of Seattle Box.
74. For sake of argument, I will assume that Seattle Box either did not or could not
opt out of publication. For more information on opting out of publication, see supra notes
16-17 and accompanying text.
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Hypothetical Two ("H2")

In the second hypothetical, the facts are the same as in Hi,
except that the defendant, instead of making bundling systems
having spacer blocks with a height one-sixteenth of an inch less
than the diameter of the pipe, the blocks have a height that is
one-sixteenth of an inch greater than the diameter of the pipe.
3. Applying the "Without Substantive Change" Standard to
HI and H2
Applying the "without substantive change" standard to both
hypothetical situations, Seattle Box (the patentee) would be denied
reasonable royalties under 35 U.S.C. § 154(d). That is, the claims in
the published application will be deemed to be not substantially
identical to the claims in the issued patent because the scope of
the claims was broadened during examination. Under the reissue
case law, the claims are not "without substantive change," and
therefore, not substantially identical to those originally published.
Accordingly, one of the statutory prerequisites for obtaining
provisional rights will not be met the claims are not
substantially identical.
While this result seems proper in the case of 111, because the
defendant attempted to legitimately design around the published
claims, in the case of H2, the result plainly frustrates the policy
considerations behind the provisional right statute. As previously
discussed, the award of provisional rights should function to
motivate participation in the pre-issuance publication process and
deter copying, while the substantial identity pre-requisite should
ensure that the patentee adequately notifies the public of what he
believes to be his invention at the time of publication. In the above
hypothetical situations, the patentee appears to have met his
obligation under the patent process by specifically claiming spacers
with heights greater than the diameter of the pipes. While in H1 the
defendant legitimately designed around the claims by making the
height of his spacers slightly smaller than the diameter of the pipe,
the defendant in H2 did not. In fact, the defendant in H2
unabashedly copied the published invention by making spacers
having a height slightly greater than the diameter of the pipe. Yet,
in both cases, the defendant will not be liable to Seattle Box for
reasonable royalties under the provisional rights statute. In Hi, the
defendant is not liable because (1) the scope of the claim changed
during prosecution (i.e., the claims are not substantially identical);
and (2) the defendant designed around the claims (i.e., the

686

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 40:667

defendant's pre-issuance activities did not infringe upon the claims
of the published application). In H2, however, the defendant is not
liable solely because of how the substantial identity requirement is
75
applied.
The application of the reissue standard for claim-identity
unmistakably thwarted both the deterrent and motivational
functions of the provisional rights standard in H2. Consequently,
the defendant is allowed to make use of the published invention
during the pre-issue period without legal recourse by the patentee,
despite that the defendant had full notice that he was practicing
what the patentee regarded as his invention at the time the
application was published. This result simply does not reconcile the
interests involved in the provisional rights situation. As discussed
infra, although less incongruous, a similar unacceptable result is
obtained when narrowing amendments are considered.
B. Narrowing Amendments During Prosecution
1. Hypothetical Three ("H3")
Seattle Box files a patent application containing claims reciting a
bundling system comprising spacer blocks with a height that is
substantially equal to or greater than the diameter of the pipe to
be bundled. The application is published eighteen-months from its
earliest priority date. During prosecution, Seattle Box amends the
claims to recite a spacer having a height that is greater than the
diameter of the pipe to be bundled. The amendments clearly
narrow the scope of the claims as compared to the published
claims. A patent subsequently issues on the published application
with the narrowed claims.
Assume now that after publication of the application and prior to
issuance of the original Seattle Box patent, the defendant begins
making and selling a bundling system similar to that in the
published application; however, the defendant's bundling system
uses spacer blocks having a height one-sixteenth of an inch less
than the diameter of the pipe.
2.

Hypothetical Four ("H4")

In the fourth hypothetical, the facts are the same as given in
75. This situation is greatly simplified to highlight the fundamental problem of applying
the "without substantive change" construction in the context of provisional rights.
Competently drafted, the issued patent in H2 would contain claims of equivalent scope to
those published, and provisional rights would be granted. However, the fundamental
deficiency of applying the reissue standard in provisional rights cases remains.
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above in H3, except that instead of the defendant making bundling
systems having spacer blocks with a height one-sixteenth of an
inch less than the diameter of the pipe, the blocks have a height
that is one-sixteenth of an inch greater than the diameter of the
pipe.
3. Applying the "Without Substantive Change" Standard to
H3 and H4
Again applying the reissue claim-identity standard to both
hypothetical situations, Seattle Box would likely be denied any
claim to reasonable royalties because the claims in the published
application will be deemed to not be substantially identical to the
claims in the issued patent; in other words, because the scope of
Seattle Box's claims was narrowed during examination, the claims
would likely be found to not be without substantive change. This is
true, in both H3 and H4, wherein the defendant's pre-issue activities
would likely be determined to have infringed on the claims of the
published application, either literally or possibly, by equivalents. 76
Arguably, the results of applying the reissue precedent in both
H3 and H4 are not wholly inconsistent with the function of the
provisional rights statute. Because the claims were narrowed
during prosecution, and even though the defendant's
post-publication activities would likely be held to infringe the
published claims, one could easily argue that Seattle Box did not
carry its burden of informing the public of what it believed to be
its invention. As a result, the defendant had "no guidance as to the
specific behavior to avoid between publication and grant."7
Furthermore, an estoppel argument against granting provisional
rights in such a circumstance could also be made under the facts
of H3. For example, because the patentee limited the scope of his
claims during prosecution to exclude the defendant's activities from
the scope of the patent, the patentee should be estopped from
recovering reasonable royalties from the defendant. That is, it
76. See infra note 80. Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents protects a
patentee in a situation where a would-be infringer makes an insubstantial change to a claim
element so as to take his activities out of the literal scope of the claims to avoid
infringement. Under the doctrine of equivalents, a patentee can enforce his patent against
such activities, despite that the offending activity does not literally infringe on the claims of
the patent. It has been said, "[t]he essence of the doctrine [of equivalents] is that one may
not practice a fraud on the patent." Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products
Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
77. H.R. REP. No. 106-287, Section-by-Section Analysis. See supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
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would not be equitable to permit the patentee to recapture the
rights he surrendered during prosecution via the provisional rights
78
statute.
However, the estoppel argument does not apply to H4; although
the patentee similarly narrowed the claims, the assertion of
provisional rights would not recapture subject matter that the
patentee relinquished during prosecution. In other words, the
patentee cannot be said to have given up his rights to the aspect of
his invention at issue because the defendant's pre-issuance
activities in H4 infringe both the claims of the published
application and the claims of the issued patent. The same cannot
be said in H3; the defendant's activities did not infringe the claims
as patented.
VII. MOVING TOWARDS A POLICY-BASED CONSTRUCTION OF THE
CLAIM-IDENTITY REQUIREMENT OF THE PROVISIONAL RIGHTS STATUTE

Although one can argue for the extension of the reissue
precedent based on the notice function of publishing applications,
such an argument fails to comprehend all of the policy
considerations involved in the provisional rights legislation.
Construing the provisional rights' claim-identity requirement in
accordance with the reissue precedent fails to adequately express
the deterrent and motivational functions of granting provisional
rights, while at the same time over-emphasizes the interest of the
public in pre-issuance notice of potentially patentable inventions. 79
Similarly, another incomplete
outcome
results if the
claim-identity requirement is construed solely in terms of estoppel.
78. Estoppel arguments are found in other established patent doctrines, such as, the
"recapture rule," which limits a patentee's ability to obtain broadened claims during reissue,
and prosecution history estoppel, which limits the application of the doctrine of equivalents
in claim construction. The recapture rule "prevents a patentee from regaining through
reissue the subject matter that he deliberately surrendered in an effort to obtain allowance
of the original patent." Carraway, supra note 28, at 76 (quoting In re Clement, 131 F3d 1464,
1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). The Federal Circuit defines prosecution history estoppel as follows:
Prosecution history estoppel is one tool that prevents the doctrine of equivalents from
vitiating the notice function of claims. Actions by the patentee, including claim
amendments and arguments made before the Patent Office, may give rise to
prosecution history estoppel. Prosecution history estoppel precludes a patentee from
obtaining under the doctrine of equivalents coverage of subject matter that has been
relinquished during the prosecution of its patent application.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, 234 F.3d 558,. 564 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
79. As previously discussed, the public's interest in notice and reliance upon the claims
in an unexamined patent application are less compelling than its interest in an issued patent.
See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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As discussed above, in H3 the patentee would be estopped from
recapturing subject matter that he lost during prosecution via the
provisional rights statute. However, in H4 the patentee would not
be precluded from seeking compensation under the provision right
statute because he would not be attempting to recapture lost
matter. Nonetheless, in H4 the question remains whether the public
had sufficient notice based upon the claims in the application to
reasonably determine what activities to avoid.
As demonstrated by the foregoing hypothetical situations, the
reissue standard for determining claim-identity is ill adapted to
confront the policy concerns surrounding the provisional rights
statute. More specifically, because various policy considerations are
involved, the claim-identity analysis employed in provisional rights
cases must encompass policy goals not embodied in the reissue
statute. In particular, the claim-identity analysis must communicate
both the deterrent and motivational aspects of the provisional
rights policy, in addition to the more general policy underlying
patent publication: namely, early notice to the public for guidance
in research and development activities.
An alternative construction of the provisional rights' substantial
identity requirement that integrates the policy goals of publishing
applications (i.e., early notice) and granting provisional rights (i.e.,
to deter copying and encourage patenting/publication) is necessary
to achieve those goals. Instead of requiring the claims in the
published application be substantially identical in scope to the
claims in the issued patent to satisfy the substantially identical
requirement, a more balanced inquiry is proposed infra. The
inquiry is cast in two-parts: the first part accounts for both the
deterrent and motivational policy goals; and the second part
accounts for the notice function of publication.
A.

A Proposed Infringement Inquiry

Under the two-part inquiry, the patentee will first be required to
demonstrate that the defendant's pre-issue activities infringe on a
claim both as published in the application and as issued in the
0 This inquiry seeks to ensure not
patent.8
only that a patentee will
80. This leaves open another question - how will the courts address the issue of
"infringement" in the context of provisional rights? Courts must assess whether the acts
believed to give rise to provisional rights constitute the making, using, offering for sale, or
selling of "the invention as claimed in the published application." 35 U.S.C. §
154(d)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). Although substantial case law exists regarding infringement on the claims
in an issued patent, no U.S. case law exists regarding infringement on unexamined claims in
a published application. Extending the developed principles of infringement to provisional
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be unable to recapture subject matter relinquished during
prosecution via the provisional right statute, but also to ensure that
a patentee's reasonable expectations of recovery under the
provisional rights statute are met.
If a defendant's pre-issuance activities infringe on both a claim in
the published application and a corresponding claim in the issued
patent, a patentee will not be prohibited from asserting provisional
rights merely because he made a scope-changing amendment to his
claims. Thus, the situation as delineated in H2 is avoided. An
infringer could not directly copy, or make insubstantial
modifications to, the invention as claimed in the published
application and avoid liability merely because the patentee changed
the scope of his claims during prosecution. Accordingly, the
inventor's reasonable expectations for collecting royalties for one
copying his invention can be safeguarded.8' Furthermore, because
under this inquiry a patentee could make changes to the scope of
the published claims during prosecution and still recover under the
provisional rights statute, this test recognizes the reality of patent
prosecution, and therefore does not require the patentee to be able
to predict exactly what the examiner will allow during prosecution.
Finally, this first inquiry also serves to reinforce the deterrence
function of granting provisional rights. 82 Because competitors could
potentially be found liable for reasonable royalties under the
provisional rights statute if they copy the claims of a published
application, regardless if scope-changing amendments are made,
competitors will be encouraged to undertake legitimate
design-around initiatives.83
rights cases is not necessarily straightforward. Of particular interest is how the courts will
deal with "infringement by equivalents" under the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution
history estoppel when dealing with provisional rights. See supra notes 76 (discussing the
doctrine of equivalents) & 78 (discussing prosecution history estoppel).
81. This portion of the test also incorporates the notice function of publication to some
extent. An inventor will not be able to draft overly broad initial claims in the hope of
ensnaring an infringer, subsequently narrow the claims during prosecution to recite his true
invention, and collect reasonable royalties under the provisional rights statute if the inventor
in the process "gives up" that portion of the invention being practiced by another. The
patentee will have to draft claims of reasonable scope to define his invention.
82. After all, the intent of publication is not to promote copying, but to encourage
technological advancement. See e.g. Carraway, supra note 28, at 596.
83. At least one commentator has criticized an inquiry based solely on infringement of
a claim in the published application and in the issued patent as placing "an unacceptable
burden on the public." American Inventors Protection Act and H.R. 1225: Hearings before
the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property & Committee on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong (1999) (testimony of Michael K Kirk, Executive Director of the American Intellectual
Property Law Association) available at http-//www.aipla.org/html/hrl225testimony.hmfl
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B. A Proposed Notice Inquiry
If the defendant's pre-issuance activities are found to infringe on
both a claim in the published application and a corresponding
claim in the issued patent, a court should then determine whether
the claim, as published in the application, gave the defendant
adequate notice of what the patentee regarded as his invention, i.e.,
did the patentee carry his burden of adequately informing the
public. Under this inquiry, if the patentee made no scope-changing
amendments to his claims, the published claims should be deemed
to provide adequate notice to the defendant of the patentee's
invention. However, if scope-changing amendments were made, a
more exacting inquiry should be undertaken.
In the case of broadening amendments, the task of the patentee
to prove adequate notice should be relatively easy. Although the
claims were broadened during prosecution, the broadened claims
encompass the more narrow claims that were originally published.
Consequently, the defendant cannot argue that he was left in the
position of guessing what would ultimately be patented, and the
4
patentee will be found to have given adequate notice.8
Consider again the hypothetical situation set forth in H2. Here,
patentee-Seattle Box should be able to demonstrate that the
published claims, which recited spacers with a height greater than
the diameter of the pipe, adequately provided notice to the
defendant of the invention as ultimately patented - i.e., spacers
with a height substantially equal to or greater than the diameter of
the pipe. Simply stated, the defendant chose to infringe on those
(March 25, 1999). In particular, Mr. Kirk stated permitting recovery based solely on
infringement of a claim in the published application and a claim in the issued patent would:
allow an applicant to include a single, extremely broad claim - even a clearly
unpatentable claim - in the published application and then leave it to the applicant's
competitors to a) imagine what the applicant might ultimately claim and b) conduct
their own private examination to determine whether any such imagined claim that the
competitor might infringe would be valid. This would unfairly shift the applicant's
responsibility of identifying patentable subject matter to the public, resulting in
wasteful and speculative effort.
Id.
The concerns expressed by Mr. Kirk are addressed in the present proposal by requiring the
courts to also make a determination as to whether the patentee has carried his burden of
"identifying patentable subject matter," in addition to demonstrating infringement of both a
claim in the application and a claim in the issued patent, before granting provisional rights.
84. Bear in mind that to get to the second part of the inquiry, the patentee must have
already demonstrated that the defendant's pre-issuance activities infringed upon the claims
as published -and as issued. Thus, where the defendant infringed upon the relatively narrow
scope of the published claims, it would be difficult to find that the patentee did not provide
the defendant with adequate notice.
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claims and risked of being held liable for reasonable royalties for
such actions.
In the case of narrowing amendments, the patentee's task will
be more difficult. Specifically, because the patentee narrowed the
scope of his claims during prosecution, the claims that finally
issued do not include all subject matter initially claimed. Thus, a
court could hold that the defendant necessarily had to speculate as
to what was ultimately patentable. To establish that the patentee
gave sufficient notice, the patentee should be prepared to, for
instance, point to specific examples in the published application, or
the disclosed best mode, to demonstrate that the public was not
made to bear the burden of determining what the inventor
considered to be his invention. Other factors that the court should
consider in this inquiry include: the prior art disclosed by the
patentee; the other claims in the published application; and the
prosecution history, including the extent and reason for any
amendments to the scope of the claims.
This notice inquiry also incorporates and reinforces the statutory
requirement that the patent applicant give actual notice to the
defendant of the published application before reasonable royalties
can be collected under the statute. 85 For example, as part of the
notice inquiry, the patentee should be allowed to demonstrate that
he gave some particularized notice to the defendant particular
activities of the defendant were believed to infringe upon specific
claims in the published application.8 6 If the patentee can
successfully establish that the defendant's activities infringed on
both a claim in the published application and a corresponding
claim in the issued patent, and that the patentee gave sufficient
notice as to what the patentee regarded as his invention, the claims
should be deemed to be "substantially identical," and the patentee
should receive reasonable royalties under the provisional rights
85. Under the provisional rights statute, damages can only be collected for activities
that occur after actual notice has been given. See supra note 11 (discussing the actual notice
requirement). Thus, if an applicant believes that someone is infringing on a published claim,
the applicant must notify the would-be infringer, prior to issuance of the patent, in order to
collect reasonable royalties. If no notice is given before issuance, no royalties can be
collected, even if all other statutory prerequisites for granting provisional rights have been
met. Id.
86. While the notice prong of the two-part inquiry proposed in this comment is, in part,
a function of the defendant's knowledge, policy considerations justify such a "subjective"
approach. The fact that the provisional rights statute requires the patentee to give actual
notice to the defendant regarding the published application specifically places the
defendant's knowledge in question. In other words, the actual notice provision suggests an
inquiry based upon the defendant's knowledge and not merely that of the public at large.
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statute.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Congress, in providing for the early publication of U.S. patent
applications, has permitted the public to see what is in the "patent
pipeline" so as to prevent wasting research and development
resources, and to enable legitimate design around activities.
However, the public does not have the same compelling interest in
being able to rely on the claims of an unexamined, published
application as it does in relying on the claims of issued patents.
Accordingly, holding a patentee in a provisional rights case to the
reissue standard for claim-identity is improper and, moreover,
defeats the purpose of awarding provisional rights in the first place.
The provisional rights remedy is not automatic; it does not
accrue until the patentee establishes some right to the published
invention by obtaining a patent, and then only to the extent that
the patentee gave sufficient notice to the public of what was likely
to be patented. The above infringement/notice inquiry recognizes
this by requiring the patentee to prove that the defendant's
activities infringe on both a claim in the issued patent and a
corresponding claim in the published application. Thus, the
patentee must not have given up rights to the invention as
practiced by the defendant during prosecution of his application.
Also, by requiring the court to make a determination of whether
sufficient notice was given, the public's interest in early notification
can be protected.
"A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest,"8 7
and that the "success [of the U.S. intellectual property system] is
dependent upon a rational and sound policy of protecting
intellectual property by encouraging the development of new
inventions and processes."88 The claim-identity requirement of the
provisional rights statute should be applied so as to give effect to
the interests the statute is meant to vindicate. Artificially extending
the case law construing and applying the reissue claim-identity
requirement to provisional rights cases will not give effect to those
interests, and is not sound policy. Despite that the same words "substantially identical" - express the requirement in both statutes,
87. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
816 (1945) quoted in Smith, supra note 17, at 585. See also 37 C.FR. §1.56(a).
88. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 H.R. 1907, HR. REP. No. 106-287,
Background and Need for the Legislation, pages 31-33, (1999) available at http://
thomas.loc.gov (Aug. 3, 1999).
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policy considerations demonstrate that the statutes are not in pari
materia and should not be treated as such by the courts.
Kami Lammon-Hilinski

